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ABSTRACT 
The article applies a "fixed-effect" methodology to evaluate the training 
impacts of the Vocat ional Rehabilitation program. Two central issues are 
identification of an acceptab l e comparison group and adjusting for sources 
of selection-bias. The use of program dropouts as a comparison group i s 
examined with a modified Hausman test . The results suggest spending on VR 
may be more cost-effective in view of the high public cost of . serving the 
disabled in a full dependency mode. These estimates of VR training impacts 
are compared with th e performance of CETA, a public program serving the non-
disabled which has been examined extensively using the fixed-effect estimator. 
The Vocational Rehabilitation Program (VR) is a federal/state partnership 
providing services to help persons with disabilities return to work. Since 
its inception in 1920, the program has been advanced on its economic merit. 
Today VR is a $1. 5 billion dollar program, a level of public funding suggesting 
a long history of demonstrated cost-effectiveness. In fact, considerable 
skepticism shrouds the data and methods which have generated impressive 
benefit-cost ratios in the past. In the most recent survey, Berkowitz et 
al. (1988) provide an extensive discussion of the problems facing program 
evaluation. A major conclusion of that study is the data collected on VR 
activities do not adequately measure program inputs or client outcomes. 1 
The significance of these data limitations is heightened in light of recent 
developments in the general manpower training literature. Since the Great 
Society era, federal involvement in employment programs has grown 
significantly. 2 Commensurate with this growth have been efforts by economists 
to measure the earnings effects of government training initiatives. The 
resulting 1 i terature has produced important refinements in the techniques 
of assessing earnings impacts. These advances include various comparison-
group methodologies to control for pre-program differences (Wes tat, 1982; 
Dickinson et al., 1986] consideration of "pre-program dip" in program 
1 Evaluation is typically conducted using the R-300 data set, a federal 
reporting system of states' VR activities. While the R-300 reports the total 
dollar value of services received on a per client basis, there is no clear way 
to determine the nature, duration, or intensity of treatment. Also, pre-
program labor force participation data is scant and no longitudinal information 
on post-program earnings exists. Finally, no outcome measures other than 
earnings are collected (e.g. changes in occupation, hours worked, functioning). 
2 For a.xample, the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 (MDTA), 
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA), the National 
Supported Work Demonstration (NSW) of the mid-1970s, and the Job Training 
Partnership Act of 1982 (JPTA). 
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evaluation [Ashenfelter, 1975, 1978; Kiefer, 1979; Bassi, 1983) and correction 
procedures for assorted sources of selection bias in quasi-experimental designs 
[Heckman, 1979; Bassi, 1984; Ashenfelter & Card, 1985). 
This article is the first attempt to apply these assessment methods to 
the VR Program. For this purpose we have compiled a data set containing 
longitudinal earnings profiles for trainees. The longitudinal earnings are 
important because they accommodate econometric tests for selection bias, as 
well as various specifications to obtain unbiased treatment impacts even in 
the presence of nonrandom selection. Section I contains discussion of the 
VR program, its basic data profile and limitations, and the significance of 
our enhanced earnings profiles. Section II presents the estimation procedure. 
Section III discusses the choice of a comparison group within the VR setting. 
Empirical results appear in Section IV. 
I. Issues in the Evaluation of VR 
The vocational rehabilitation program offers a wide assortment of services 
to disabled persons. Clients receive varying combinations of diagnosis, 
restorative medical treatment, education, training, job placement and 
counseling. This array of service reflects a program which serves persons with 
physical, mental, or emotional impairments. 3 The broad orientation of VR 
has several implications for evaluation. First, one can expect differential 
impacts in a training program providing a wide variety of services for a 
3 The diversity of services and clientele parallels the changing political 
mandates which have been placed upon the program over its 67 year history. 
VR was conceived in response to the needs of the physically impaired veterans 
of World War I. The nature of the VR clientele was expanded in the 1940s 
with the advent of workers'compensation. VR's mission was again broadened 
in the Kennedy Administration to serve persons with mental retardation. In 
the 1970s political emphasis on deinstitutionalization exerted new pressures 
to treat the chronically mentally ill. 
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relatively diverse clientele. 4 Second, the type of disability will often 
dictate not only the treatment but the treatment impact as well. 5 VR is 
also unique in that the service regimen varies greatly in substance and 
duration across clients. 
A state VR agency collects varying degrees of information on each applicant 
depending on how far the client progresses through the program. 6 Each client 
record contains information on demographic traits, type of disability, types 
of services received, total value of these services, length of time spent in 
the various treatments, and a limited earnings profile. 
Data Limitations 
Under current data collection, a client's earnings profile contains a 
maximum of two earnings points -- at acceptance and closure from the program-
- with closure earnings being available only for the fraction of clients 
completing VR in Status 26. Status 26 denotes a client placed in a job and 
retaining employment for a period of sixty days. Adopting simplistic 
assumptions, the net impact of VR services may be calculated as the difference 
4 For an analysis of the differential impacts of the multitude of services 
provided in CETA see Dickinson et al. (1986). 
5 For example, clients with physical disabilities may have an acute medical 
condition for which they receive restorative service (prosthesis or surgery). 
After some education or re-training, they can be placed in a "good" job 
relatively quickly. In contrast, persons with mental disabilities may have 
a developmental problem. Their treatment will invariably include work 
adjustment training for a fixed period and then placement into "sheltered 
employment" or a low- level competitive position. The emotionally disabled 
are often clients with a chronic condition. They are usually assigned to a 
psychiatric-caseload counselor for intensive evaluation, counseling and 
personal a<;ljustment training, possibly followed by job placement. 
follows: Status 08--6 Closure statuses for VR clients are defined as 
Applied but not accepted for services; Status 26 
services, and rehabilitated; Status 28 -- Accepted, 
rehabilitated; Status 30 -- Accepted but no services 
Accepted, received 
received services, not 
received (i.e. drop out). 
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between earnings at acceptance and closure. However, this earnings profile 
is grossly deficient for evaluation in several respects. 
First, the earnings reported at acceptance are unlikely to reflect the 
true pre-program earnings path of a client due to "pre-program dip". 
Pre-program dip connotes a decline in client earnings immediately prior to 
seeking assistance. Although this decline is understandable given that people 
are more apt to turn to training programs when faced with employment 
difficulties, it is unlikely that earnings reported at this time capture a 
trainee's true pre-program earnings potential. The true long-run earnings 
path may be understated. If so, these earnings do not represent how the 
client would fare in the absence of treatment, and therefore are a poor baseline 
for assessing net training effects. Furthermore, VR may be an extreme case 
of pre-program dip. It is common for clients to report zero earnings in the 
week prior to application to the program. 7 
A second problem exists with the earnings recorded at closure by Status 
26 clients. Although this earnings datum is accurate for the client's sixty 
days of employment, it is tenuous to impute a post-program earnings path 
from a single, very short-run employment spell. Indeed, given the rather high 
recidivism rate in VR, it would be more appropriate to assume decay in the 
post-program earnings stream. 
A third data problem follows from the fact that a significant fraction 
of clients receiving VR services are closed in Status 28 -- received services 
but not successfully placed in employment. Obviously no closure earnings are 
available tor this group. However, while it is true that Status 28 clients 
7 Our data indicate that of the cases closed in the Virginia VR program 
in FY 1982, 78% reported no earnings in the week prior to acceptance. 
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have no earnings within the limited time perspective of the agency, there 
is evidence indicating that many clients closed is Status 28 do ultimately 
get jobs. 8 The lapse in evaluation is obvious - - Status 28 clients typically 
receive a substantial level of services and may derive significant benefits 
from their VR experience, but these benefits will not be captured if employment 
is not forthcoming within the agency's sixty-day closure vigil. 
These specific problems with the client earnings records reflect the 
more general problem of not having a longitudinal data set. Through the 
cooperation of the Virginia Department of Rehabilitative Services (VDRS) and 
the Virginia Employment Commission (VEC), we have constructed a data link 
through which longitudinal earnings records for VR clients were obtained. 
The data set contains 9,107 Status 26, 28 and 30 closures from the Virginia 
VR program for fiscal year (FY) 1982. These clients were matched by social 
security number with quarterly earnings records of the VEC. The resulting 
profiles span nine years of quarterly earnings from the fourth quarter of 
1976 through the fourth quarter of 1985. This time frame provides sufficiently 
long pre- and post-program employment histories relative to the 1982 closure 
data which defines our VR population. Of the 9,107 possible cases, 6,533 
had a record of VEC earnings for at least one of the 34 quarters noted above. 
This reflects a "hit rate" of 72%. 9 
8 Social Security records for 1977 reveal that the "unsuccessful" Status 
28 cases closed in 1975 actually enjoyed average earnings in 1977 of $3,662. 
Moreover, these earnings were not dramatically lower than the $4,041 averaged 
by Status 26 clients (RSA, 1982). 
9 Matcl,J.ng SSA records encounters coverage gaps. It is impossible to 
distinguish persons who never worked from those whom either worked in non-VEC 
covered employment, or who worked "off the books". Also, because the VEC 
earnings records are state specific, we can not capture the earnings of employed 
VR clients who move or work out of state. 
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II. Estimation Procedures 
A major issue in recent training program evaluations has been controlling 
for nonrandom se l ection bias. Selection bias can surface when the decision 
to participate in a program is not random with respect to the disturbance 
term in an earnings function. The problem is that people who undergo a specific 
treatment regimen may have a dif fer ent earnings structure from those who do 
not, even i n the absence of training. This bias occurs due to either 
correlation between t he systematic component of the participation equation 
and the unobserved earnings error (selection on the observables) or correlation 
between the error terms in the participation and earnings equation (selection 
on the unobservables components). Much of the recent literature [Bass i, 1983; 
Ashenfelter and Card , 1985] has focused on the latter relationship. 10 Selection 
on the unobservables typically stems from either of two sources: 1) self-
selection by participants; or 2) "creaming" by program administrators . As 
Moffitt [ 1987] has observed, for this selection bias to occur in VR, the client 
or counselor must have more information on the unobserved error structure 
than the program analyst. The presence of such a bias will re nder OLS estimates 
for the treatment impact inconsistent. More specifically, correlation between 
the error components of a participation equation and an earnings equation 
will bias OLS estimates of the treatment impact. 
The estimator we apply in this study is concerned with non-random selection 
based on individual trainee's unobservable characteristics. These are assumed 
to be constant over time. The conven tio nal form of the model is written: 
1 0 Bassi's contribution to this evaluation methodology was to derive a 
more generalized version of the fi rst difference or "fixed effects" model 
originally developed by Mundl ak ( 1961, 1978) and appli ed to labor economics 
by Ashenfelter (1978) and Chamberlain (1982). 
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where 
x,sQ 
Yit earnings of an individual in the post-treatment year t 11 
Yis earnings for the same individual in the pre-treatment years 12 
Xit row vector of human capital characteristics that affect earnings 
Q column vector of parameter estimates for these explanatory variables 
Pi binary dummy variable measuring program participation where Pi= 1 
designates a program participant and Pi = 0 if not 
~t the effect of treatment for the period t which can vary for different 
time periods and thus allows for different payoff profiles 13 
ci error component constant over time but specific to the individual, 
such as IQ or innate ability 
ct an error component constant across individuals but varying over 
time, such as macroeconomic phenomena as recessions 
cit = white noise error component that varies across time and individuals. 
In a random effects OLS specification, the consistency and unbiasedness 
of the treatment estimator requires that the error component in the equation 
which is estimated is indeed random. This is seldom true in applications to 
11 For the dropouts the t period is for those annual earnings starting 
with the period immediately proceeding termination from the program. 
12 It is assumed that periods occurs post-disability onset. In the 
absence of information about the date of disability onset this can only be 
speculated on. 
13 The time dependent coefficient on the treatment dummy denotes that 
the impact of training depends on the date received. With the dependent 
variable being the level and not the log of earnings the treatment impact 
coefficien~ ~ is not a pure percentage effect. Problems will arise in an 
inflationary climate where a 5% increase in earnings due to treatment will 
have a greater impact as earnings go up with inflation. The treatment impact 
will then be overstated. 
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training programs. The general fixed effects model advanced by Ashenfelter 
allows for correlation between the unobserved individual-specific, or fixed 
component, and the participation dummy. In this framework, a simple 
differencing of pre and post-treatment earnings regressed on the change in 
the independent variables between the two periods will yield a consistent 
estimator of the treatment effect fJ. 
then becomes: 
The first order difference equation 
In this model the fixed error component does not vary by assumption and it 
is simply differenced out. 14 
The choice of the appropriate pre- and post-program earnings years is 
important in the fixed effects difference-in-differences specification. 
Studies have obtained vastly different treatment effects depending on the 
choice of base period earnings. 15 In more recent work, Ashenfelter and Card 
(1985) note that this problem arises because the random component of earnings, 
Eit, may be correlated over time. The presence of pre-program dip indicates 
that the applicant's transitory component of earnings is unusually low during 
this time period. Any autocorrelation of the transitory component implies 
that the participant's earnings also will be low in adjacent periods. 
Therefore, the difference-in-differences estimates using different base periods 
of earnings would be expected to yield varying treatment impacts. 
14 The Bassi generalization allows for serially correlated errors as 
well as fixed effects ei. The problem encountered in adapting this technique 
to the VR program is that there is no reported information about the date of 
onset of d:i.sabili ty. Subsequently, it is impossible to ascertain whether 
pre-program earnings are pre- or post-disability onset. 
15 Ashenfelter (1978) and Dickinson et al. (1986). 
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Heckman and Robb (198 5) have demonstrated that, despite potential 
correlation in the random component of earnings, one can still obtain similar 
estimates of the treatme nt effect by dif f e re nc ing symmetrically around a 
decision year. The symmetric difference- in-differences approach accounts 
f or the serial correlation in the transitory component of earnings as long 
as the appropriate decision year is chosen; thus the main issue is the choice 
of the appropriate decision year. The difficulty in applying this method to 
VR is that, unlike most training programs, clients' service regimens vary in 
duration. The init ial model we consider is a first difference fixed effects 
estimator. We also estimate the model using an earlier pre - program earnings 
period to account for pre-program dip. 
In the fixed effects model, a first-difference of pre- and post - program 
earnings is regressed on a vector of explanatory variables inclu ding a VR 
participate/dropout (treatment) dummy variable. The specification of the VR 
earnings model includes change-in-age, change - in -age squared, and a dummy 
variable for the year of program r e ferr al . 16 Human capital theory (Mincer, 
1974) predicts that earnings are quadratic in age since age is generally 
considered as a proxy for experience. However, change-in-age is not as readily 
interpreted here because the difference in t he level of ages is lost in the 
differencing process. Given t he varying leng t hs of program exposure for VR 
clients, the change-in-age is not measu ring aging ef fec ts so much as duration 
16 There are other variables inc luded in previous studies (Dickinson et 
al., 1986) that may change over the given time interval and thus do not 
difference out (e.g. mari ta l status, education for younger persons). The 
cross-sec t ional R300 data set does not allow th e inclusion of such measures. 
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in the program. 17 As a measure of duration, the change-in-age variable may 
be picking up two countervailing effects. If the person has low opportunity 
costs to their time, a longer duration may be expected to have a negative 
impact on earnings. This would represent the lower value of the opportunity 
set available to the person. On the other hand, for persons with the same 
opportunity set, an extra year of treatment may lead to a greater return on 
the invested time. This may be manifested via a larger earnings level upon 
program completion and a subsequently positive duration effect. 
The year of referral dummies are included to control for business cycle 
fluctuations ( time inhomogeneity). The reference category is referral to 
the program in 1979. The time dummies for 1980 through 1982 account for 
economy-wide fluctuations that may have led to the person's applying for 
services during this period. 18 If the business cycle in Virginia was concurrent 
with the rest of the country, the economy was in the trough of a recession 
in 1982. Estimating treatment effects during a recessionary period without 
controlling for changes in economic conditions will lead to lower estimates 
than would otherwise be the case. Conversely, the closer the year of referral 
to the trough of the business cycle, the greater the imputed impact on earnings 
of remedial manpower training programs. We expect positive signs on the 
referral year dummies with respect to the reference period of 1979. 
17 By comparing earnings in the pre- and post-training years, everyone's 
age changes by at least two years. However, VR services are provided to some 
over a very short period while others stay in the program for several years. 
18 There is no doubt some collinearity between this categorical time 
dummy and the change in age variables since both measures are reflecting 
duration ii;} the program. To see this recall that the sample includes all 
persons closed in fiscal year 1982. All persons referred in 1982 had the 
shortest time-in-program spell and changed only the minimum of two years in 
age. For persons referred in 1980, the duration is roughly three years and 
the change in age will be five years. 
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III. Issues in Assessing Program Impact in VR 
Comparison Group Selection 
The optimal methodology for assessing training effects is a pure 
experimental design in which participants are randomly assigned to treatment 
and control groups. This approach is infeasible in VR, however, due to the 
obvious ethical/legal issue of randomly denying the services of a public 
program to otherwise eligible clients. 
"comparison" group methodology. 19 
The next best approach is a 
The choice of a comparison group is guided in imoortant respects by 
institutional aspects of the VR program. The general problem in VR is that 
enrollment in a particular service regimen is not a random event. A client 
passes through programmatic and self-screening devices before becoming a VR 
participant. The client must first apply for the program. This can occur 
on their own initiative or via referral by another social service agency. 
Following application, the VR staff makes the decision to accept/reject the 
person. 20 If accepted, a VR counselor suggests a menu of services (IWRP) to 
be provided. 
the program. 
Finally, the client chooses whether or not to participate in 
Thus an individual who successfully completes the program has 
made several discrete choices to apply for services, to accept the 
prescribed treatment, and to follow through with the implementation of the 
IWRP. This process introduces significant selectivity bias since the multistage 
19 Discussions of the significance of experimental design versus comparison 
group methods in training program evaluation are provided by Burtless & Orr 
• (1986) and LaLonde (1986). 
20 Acceptance to VR requires that: 1) the client have a medically certified 
physical or mental impairment; 2) the impairment presents a vocational handicap; 
and 3) the handicap can be remedied through the provision of appropriate services. 
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participation decis ion, as well as the subsequent earnings levels of a client, 
can be systematically influenced by unobserved variables. Minimizing 
selectivity b ia s is a major cr ite rion in se le cting the comparison group. 
For conventiona l manpower programs it has been conrnon to draw a comparison 
group from the Current Population Survey (Westat, 1981; Bassi, 1983; Dickinson, 
et al., 1986). The main problem with the CPS data is there are likely to be 
significant differences between VR applicants and a random sample of the CPS. 
For exa mple , even if the observed differences can be control l ed for, there 
can still be unobservable factors such as the initiative which leads a person 
to apply for VR services. Furthermore, the same unobservable traits that 
lead a client to participate in VR can also influence their level of success. 
Therefore, the earnings paths of a CPS sample who have not sought VR services 
would represent biased estimates of how VR clients may have fared in the 
absence of training. A comparison group based on the CPS is also flawed due 
to insufficient informa ti on about the presence of a disability for persons 
in the survey. This is critical since disability is a major factor determining 
an individual's pre-program earnings profile. Different types of disabilities 
can influence pre-program earnings, the serv i ce regimen provided by the VR 
agency, as well as the outcome of these services. For these reasons the CPS 
is inappropriate for a comparison group for evaluation of VR clients. 
The alternative to the CPS is an "inter nal" comparison group -- a cohort 
having had some degree of exposure to the program. The institutional nature 
of VR offers three different classes of internal comparisons groups: 1) persons 
who applied for but were not accepted for VR services (Status 08); 2) persons 
not successfully rehabilitated after receiving services (Status 28); and 
persons who are accepted and agree to participa t e, but leave the program 
12 
prior to receiving any treatment (Status 30). 
Several studies of VR [RSA, 1982; Abt & Associates, 1974] have used the 
Status 28 cohort (not rehabilitated) as a comparison group. Since this group 
passes through the multiple screens to become a program participant, it would 
seem that selection bias would not be an issue. However, the Status 28 cohort 
is unacceptable because this group suffers from a variation of "contamination 
bias" - - they have been exposed to the services that normally would be reserved 
for the treatment group in a true experimental setting. Accordingly, one 
lacks the dichotomization necessary to isolate the effects of the intervention 
undertaken. Indeed, one should not only avoid the Status 28's as a comparison 
group, but rather include them as part of the treatment group. Omitting 
this cohort from the treatment group imparts an clear upward bias to the 
service impacts since only "successfully" rehabilitated clients will remain. 
The second possible internal comparison group contains individuals 
declared ineligible for VR services (Status 08). 21 We reject this group because 
they differ in both observable and unobservable characteristics vis-a-vis 
the treatment group. The problem is that acceptance involves elements of 
self-selection and programmatic screening. Moreover, the programmatic screens 
can imply informal consideration by administrators such as "creaming" or 
even "scraping". 2 2 The latter may be especially true in VR since the program 
was mandated to serve a more severely disabled population in 1973. These 
measured and unmeasured differences preclude them as a proxy for what the 
earnings of VR participants would have been in the absence of treatment. 
21 Status 08 are persons judged by the VR staff to not have a disability 
or vocational handicap, or persons with disabilities deemed irremediable by 
VR. The deficiencies of the Status 08 are discussed by Englander (1985). 
22 These issues are addressed by Bassi (1983) and Card & Sullivan (1986). 
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we believe the criterion of minimizing pre-enrollment differences 
recommends Status 30 clients as the comparison group. Recall, the Status 30 
client is a dropout. The use of dropouts may invite negative connotations 
initially; in fact, this cohort has conceptual appeal. 2 3 First, Status 30 
clients had the motivation to apply and they met the eligibility criteria. 
This obviates the need to model the application and acceptance decision. 
Second, it is likely that both successfully rehabilitated clients and dropouts 
experience similar depreciations in human capital which lead them to apply 
to VR. Finally, because the Status 30 clients are closed without receiving 
any prescribed treatment, the only service received by this cohort is a 
diagnostic evaluation. Diagnosis alone is unlikely to have significant effect 
on the client's human capital. 
Still, the fact that the Status 30 clients self-select out of the program 
at an early stage suggests unobservable attributes within this group which 
can introduce bias. Is this group generally less motivated? Or is it more 
ambitious, viewing the employment prospects on their own as greater than 
with VR assistance? 24 Or has the employment outlook for this group 
systematically improved relative to what it had been? The concern is that 
some elements of unobservable difference between the treatment and comparison 
groups which are correlated with future earnings probably persist. However, 
on balance, the measured and unmeasured difference between the Status 30 
cohort versus any other viable comparison group would surely be greater. 
23 Cooley et al. also conclude that "no-shows" are a superior comparison 
group in many training settings because "they have many characteristics in 
common wit!. those who were trained" (1979; pp. 123-124). 
2 4 Burtless ( 1985) discovered that some graduates of trainee programs 
were adversely stigmatized in the eyes of employers due to participation. 
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Testing the Quality of the Internal Comparison Group 
Bassi's model tests specifically for the presence and significance of 
"creaming" on the part of program administrators. Creaming implies that 
program administrators, who are evaluated on the basis of successful closures, 
will a ccept persons for services who are temporarily below their permanent 
earnings path. In doing so they are selecting clients likely to fare the 
best since they have higher permanent income levels. 25 The concept of creaming 
is given a unique twist in VR program due to the 1973 mandate that the program 
accept persons with severe disabilities. On the one hand, this mandate connotes 
a "scraping" ra ther than creaming bias for some clients. At the same time, 
however, counselors may feel even greater pressure to cream when possible in 
order to compensate for the more severely disabled clients in their caseload 
who are more difficult to bring to a successful closure. 
Happily, the significance of creaming or scraping is minimized in a 
comparison group comprised of program dropouts by virtue of the fact they 
were accepted for services under the same criertia as the treatment group. 
Furthermore, creaming can be controlled for if the base period chosen i s one 
several years prior to application for services. We can also test and control 
for correlation between the participation decision and individual time-specific 
earnings error component in the years prior to being accepted. 
A more significant concern when using dropouts as a comparison group 
is to determine whether there are differences in the earnings structures of 
the groups with respect to the transitory nature of pre-program d ip. The 
25 Selection bias occurs if the earnings componen! : of one of the groups 
experiences a transitory rather than permanent decline in the period immediately 
prior to application to the program. This situation underscores the importance 
of adequately adjusting for "pre-program dip". 
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two groups may have similar earnings structures for several years prior to 
program application, and then differ only in the period just prior to program 
participation. Such a circumstance reduces the reliability of the measured 
treatment impacts since a portion of the observed earnings gain is merely a 
return to the permanent earnings path from which the person had temporarily 
fallen. If the decline in earnings is largely permanent for the treatment 
group, then using a base period several years prior to program participation 
will underestimate the treatment impact. Since we are unable to untangle 
permanent from transitory declines in the earnings profiles, by using various 
base periods, we obtain upper and lower bounds of the treatment effect. 26 
To examine the validity of the Status 30's as a control for selection 
bias in a fixed effects framework, we use a modified Hausman Test of 
unobservables. 27 The test focues on a VR participation dummy in a first-
differencing equation using pre-program earnings. The dummy measures the 
mean value of the error term -- in this instance, the error term differenced 
over the two periods. A significant coefficient indicates selection bias 
due to correlation between the error term and program participation. Since 
we have only three years of pre-program earnings for the majority of the 
sample, there are two dependent variables to consider -- change in earnings 
over periods (s-1) and (s-2) and (s-2) and (s-3). Significant coefficients 
2 6 Unfortunately, we do not have data on the date of onset of the 
disabling condition. If we did, we could examine the earnings streams both 
pre and post-disability onset to determine whether the dip is pennanent or transitory. 
2 7 We also tested the assumption that the observable component of the 
earnings functions for the treatment (Status 26 & 28) and comparison groups 
(Status 30) would be the same in the absence of VR. Using pre-program earnings 
for the va~ious years as the dependent variable, a Chow test reveals if the 
coefficients for a random effects (OLS) estimator differ between the treatment 
and dropout groups. Of the six disabilty cohorts, the F-statistic for equality 
of coefficients was significant only for physically disabled men. 
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on the participation dummies suggest unobservable differences between the 
treatment and comparison groups and thus render the fixed effects estimation 
inconsistent. 28 
The results of the Hausman tests are reported in Table 1. Estimation 
of the earnings equation was performed by disability (physical, mental and 
emotional) and gender stratifications. 29 The coefficients on the treatment 
variable were significant (and positive) for physically disabled men in both 
intervals. This implies pre-program unobservable differences for these clients, 
making their pre-program earnings significantly higher than program dropouts. 
The Status 30 cohort is thus a poor comparison group for men with physical 
disabilities. The treatment dummy was also significant for physically disabled 
women in the first pre-program interval, but insignificant in the interval 
for two to three years prior to program referral. For each of the remaining 
four cohorts there were no significant unobservable differences between cohorts 
for either of the two time intervals. Therefore, except for physically disabled 
men, a fixed effects estimator should lead to unbiased and consistent estimates 
if we use earnings in either the one or two years prior to program referral 
as the base year for measuring treatment impacts. 
Longitudinal Data Alignment Issues 
Our VR data set is comprised of closed cases from Virginia's program 
during FY 1982. When comparing service-receiving clients with program 
"drop-outs", one must consider the likelihood that these cohorts came to the 
2 8 When Bassi found such evidence she concluded that for white males 
the selection-bias was so strong that even a fixed effects specification 
would lead-to biased treatment effects. She excluded this cohort. 
29 Noted that the change in age variable in a first differencing reduces 
to a vector of l's and therefore is dropped from the estimation procedure. 
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TA
BLE 1 
M
odified 
H
ausm
an Test 
R
esults 
for 
a Fixed Effects 
Specification 
(Sorted 
by D
isability 
Type for 
Tw
o Pre-Program
 
Earnings 
Intervals) 
Physically 
D
isabled 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
·
--
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
.
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
D
ependent V
ariable: 
V
ariables 
Intercept 
Treatm
ent 
R
eferred 
in 1980 
R
eferred 
in 1981 
R
eferred 
in 1982 
Change in A
ge Sq. 
R
·Square 
F R
atio 
N
unber of O
bs. 
Prior 
Y
ear 1 Earnings 
M
inus 
Prior 
Y
ear 2 Earnings 
M
ale 
653.53 
(1.54) 
729.96 
(2.74)** 
-1533.23 
(4.88)** 
·1050.88 
(3.52)** 
-74.86 
(0. 18) 
19.52 
(4.96)** 
0.03 
13.69 
1985 
Fem
ale 
703.98 
(2.28)* 
455.94 
(2. 19)* 
-803.34 
(3.32)** 
-330.15 
(1.46) 
-21.18 
(0.08) 
13.20 
(5.10)** 
0.03 
9.90 
1516 
T R
atios 
in Parentheses 
*
 D
enotes 
significance 
at 
the 
.05 Level 
*
*D
enotes 
significance 
at 
the 
.01 Level 
Prior 
Y
ear 2 Earnings 
M
inus 
Prior 
Y
ear 3 Earnings 
M
ale 
1156.65 
(2.36)* 
929.42 
(3.00)** 
·955.96 
(2.62)** 
-1904.8 
(5.48)** 
-2153.93 
(4.38)** 
1. 19 
(0.7B) 
0.02 
9.96 
1985 
Fem
ale 
864.67 
(2.89)** 
185.42 
(0.91) 
·231.22 
(0.98) 
-461.59 
(2.10)* 
-755.67 
(2.91)** 
-0.43 
(0.51) 
0.01 
2.55 
1516 
M
entally 
D
isabled 
D
ependent V
ariable: 
Prior 
Y
ear 1 Earnings 
M
inus 
Prior 
Y
ear 2 Earnings 
M
ale 
665.35 
(2.68)** 
250.71 
(1.48) 
-220.18 
(1.13) 
-321. 71 
( 1. 70) 
-834.81 
(3.11)** 
18.10 
(5.67)** 
0.05 
11.27 
1094 
Fem
ale 
659.61 
(2.23)* 
·146.68 
(0.72) 
-242.24 
( 1.28) 
·414.17 
(2.14)* 
·642.60 
(1.61) 
4.33 
( 1. 14) 
0.01 
1.54 
587 
Prior 
Y
ear 2 Earnings 
M
inus 
Prior 
Y
ear 3 Earnings 
M
ale 
701.85 
(2.93)** 
-372.41 
(2.25)* 
-249.44 
(1.31) 
-644.95 
(3.48)** 
-503.77 
( 1.92) 
1.56 
(1.50) 
0.02 
3.46 
1094 
Fem
ale 
242.23 
C 1. 06) 
-104. 76 
(0.65) 
126. 57 
(0.86) 
-60.79 
(0.40) 
-545.78 
( 1. 74) 
0.78) 
(0.79) 
0.01 
1.30 
587 
Em
otionally 
D
isabled 
D
ependent V
ariable: 
Prior 
Y
ear 1 Earnings 
M
inus 
Prior 
Y
ear 2 Earnings 
M
ale 
1060.97 
(2.24)* 
277.13 
(1.09) 
-742.80 
(2.31 )" 
·
 1088.69 
(3.53)** 
-512.09 
(1.08) 
19 .11 
(3.36)** 
0.04 
5.96 
747 
Fem
ale 
238.95 
(0.54) 
381. 70 
( 1.35) 
·367.68 
( 1.35) 
·
 732 
.03 
(2.68)** 
·628.17 
(1.28) 
8.67 
C 1.82) 
0.03 
3.29 
604 
Prior 
Y
ear 2 Earnings 
M
inus 
Prior 
Y
ear 3 Earnings 
M
ale 
1174.61 
(2.24)* 
73.12 
(0.26) 
-614.18 
( 1. 70) 
-1216.07 
(3.50)** 
·1377.07 
(2.57)* 
-0.06 
(0.03) 
0.02 
3.38 
747 
Fem
ale 
1534.33 
(3.48)** 
·201.63 
(0. 71) 
·615. 16 
(2.25)* 
-1135.72 
(4.'3)** 
-1554. 16 
(3.14)** 
0.92 
(0.58) 
0.03 
4.16 
604 
program at slightly different times. It is evident from Table 2 that the 
treatment groups enterd the VR program earlier -- generally the latter part 
of 1980 -- as compared to the comparison groups' entry in early to mid 1981. 
Only the treatment and comparison cohorts for the physically disabled entered 
the program at roughly the same time. The fact that the treatment cohorts 
spend time in the program means they are receiving services while their 
comparison group has yet to apply. One must adjust for this timing lapse in 
order to control adequately for pre-program dip. 30 The appropriate pre-program 
earnings points must be the same period for both treatment and comparison 
groups, and must be far enough prior to both groups' application to the program 
so that neither group is likely to have earnings data reflective of pre-program 
dip. 31 The problem is the dip occurs uniformly earlier for the treatment 
group than the comparison group. For example, while the comparison group 
probably "dips II in 1980 ( depending on actual onset of disability), the treatment 
group many of whom are already in the program -- will have likely experienced 
their pre-program dip in late 1979 or early 1980. For this reason, examining 
the longitudinal earnings data on a calendar year basis is inappropriate. 
Since termination from the program can occur at any point over a 12 
month period, there is also an alignment issue in determining the appropriate 
post-program period. If a calendar quarter approach is taken, it is conceivable 
there will be comparisons between groups which entered the labor force three 
quarters apart. This seriously biases the estimated training impact if there 
is time inhomogeneity (e.g. inflation). 
3 0 This "alignment" problem is disucssed extensively by Bassi (1984) 
and Dickinson et al. (1986). 
3 1 This "sampling frame" problem is discussed by Dickinson et al., (1986). 
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V
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=
=
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=
=
=
=
=
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=
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A
verage D
uration 
in M
onths 
Quarter 
R
eferred 
to V
R Program
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D
isability 
-
-
-
-
.
 
-
.
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
.
 
-
-
-
-
-
Treatm
ent 
ICoo-parison I 
T 
(n=1686) 
I (n=299) 
Statistic 
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
 
5.01 
4.67 
2.22 
*
 
1st, 
1981 
1st, 
1981 
1 .43 
Treatm
ent 
(n=903) 
M
ale Clients 
M
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D
isability 
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!Coo-parison I 
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A
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uration 
in M
o
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Quarter 
R
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to V
R Program
 
Physical 
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.
.
.
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-
-
.
 
-
-
.
.
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-
.
 
-
-
-
.
 
-
T
reatm
e
nt 
!Coo-parison I 
T 
(n=1362) 
I (n
=154) 
!Statist
ic 
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
-
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
-
-
-
-
-
4.24 
4
.12 
0.55 
1st, 
1981 
1st, 
1981 
0
.04 
*
 
D
enotes Significance 
at 
the 
.05 Level 
*
*
 D
enotes Significance 
at 
the 
.01 Level 
Treatm
ent 
(n
=509) 
Fem
ale Clients 
M
ental D
isability 
I Coo-pariso
nl 
(n
=78) 
T 
Statistic 
=
=
===
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
-
==
=
=
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=
=
-
-
-
-
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6.15 
3.99 
7 
.84 
*
*
 
Treatm
ent 
(n=522) 
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otional D
isability 
I Coo-paris
o
nl 
cn
=82> I 
T 
Statist
ic 
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
-
-
-
-
-
-
5.70 
3.80 
6.90 
*
*
 
3
rd, 
1980 
2nd, 1981 
7
.57 
*
*
 
4th
,
 1980 
2nd, 1981 
5.90 
*
*
 
The importance of proper earnings alignment for a program of varying 
duration is further demonstrated in Table 2. The table reports the quarter 
in which a cohort, on average, was referred to VR and the average duration 
of treatment. The table is stratified by disability, gender, and treatment 
status. Note that the mentally retarded and emotionally disabled treatment 
cohorts average roughly two more months in the program and are referred for 
VR two quarters before their Status 30 (dropout) counterparts. In contrast, 
the physically disabled treatment and comparison cohorts are referred in the 
first quarter of 1981 and spend about the same amount of time in program. 
These alignment difficulties are peculiar to VR because of differing 
service durations. To address the issue, the earnings data were reconstructed 
into intervals corresponding to the appropriate pre- and post-program periods. 
Given the varying times of entry and closure, it is more accurate to use the 
earnings for the periods that start in the quarters immediately prior to 
acceptance and after treatment. Thus the sum of earnings reported in the 
four quarters immediately prior to program acceptance represent Year 1 pre-
program earnings and the four quarters following closure comprise Year 1 
post-program earnings. Annual earnings were similarly determined for the 
corresponding pre- and post-program periods for Year 2 and Year 3. 32 
Earnings summaries using annual earnings prior to referral and post 
closure for the male and female cohorts are reported in Table 3. T-tests for 
significant difference between the stratified comparison and treatment groups 
32 T~re are missing earnings data for three quarters of 1979 so for 
some clients the four quarters grouped together for the pre-program year's 
earnings may not be consecutive quarters. This gap is less serious if it 
covers the period with in which many of the clients became disabled. We 
have no way of knowing, however, because VR agencies do not request information 
on the date of onset of the client's disabling condition. 
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3 Y
ear Prior 
Earnings 
2 Y
ear Prior 
Earnings 
1 Y
ear Prior 
Earnings 
1 Y
ear Post Earnings 
2 Y
ear Post Earnings 
3 Y
ear Post Earnings 
3 Y
ear Prior 
Earning
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2 Y
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1 Y
ear P
rior 
Earnings 
1 Y
ear Post Earnings 
2 Y
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3 Y
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D
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$3,066 
$3,883 
2.36 
*
 
$4,019 
$3,823 
0
.56 
S3
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$2, 103 
3.76 
*
*
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$2,685 
3.69 
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$2,939 
4.47 
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3.57 
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$1,494 
6
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5.54 
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*
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.05 Level 
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at 
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.01 Level 
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,034 
$1,372 
1.02 
S1 ,817 
$2,094 
0.64 
S1 ,449 
$1,178 
0.74 
S2, 161 
$1
,638 
1. 12 
$2,355 
S2,017 
0.65 
$2,289 
$2,299 
0.02 
are also presented. There are several striking comparisons to be drawn. First, 
in almost all cases we observe a significant pre-program dip in earnings for 
the first year prior to program application compared to the second year prior 
to application for services. The change in earnings from the third to second 
year prior to program referral was much smaller and in several cases earnings 
increased during this interval. 33 The post-program earnings for the treatment 
group were always higher than the comparison group, with the exception of 
the later years' earnings for mentally disabled men. These differences were 
significant for the male and female physically disabled cohorts as well as 
for the female mentally retarded cohort. In terms of inter-disability 
comparisons, the physically impaired earned more than the emotionally disabled 
who in turn had higher earnings levels than the mentally retarded. The male-
female earnings differentials depended on the type of disability. 
IV. Empirical Results for Fixed Effects Earnings Impacts 
It is clear from the Hausman tests that a fixed effects model is the 
preferred estimator. Using this framework, we estimate VR treatment impacts 
based on earnings two years prior to application as the base year and one year 
after closure as the outcome year. The base year is chosen in deference to 
the pre-program dip for the dropout comparison group. Recall, the Hausman 
test indicated the biases encountered with using the first pre-program year 
earnings as the base period. 34 
33 This may reflect the onset of disability rather than the voluntary 
withdrawal from the labor market which pre-program dip often connotes. If so, 
the more recent earnings represent the client's new permanent earnings path. 
34 Also" recognize that the period around which earnings are compared is 
the interval, not the year, of program participation. Without a fixed starting 
date for the treatment and comparison group, and considering the varying 
duration of VR service regimens, the choice of a uniform base year is inappropriate. 
20 
Results for six gender/disability stratifications appear in Table 4. 
Observe that the treatment coefficients are positive for all six cohorts, 
although statistically insignificant in two cases (mentally disabled men and 
emotionally disabled women). The significant treatment coefficients range 
from $727 for emotionally disabled men to $1578 for physically disabled women. 
The year-of-referral dummies are generally insignificant except for 
mentally retarded women for 1981 and 1982. Indeed, for this cohort the year-
of-referral coefficient is greater than the treatment dumny. However, observe 
how this coefficient becomes increasingly negative (albeit insignificant) 
the shorter a person is in the program. This result suggests this variable 
may be picking up more of a duration effect then the impact of economy-wide 
fluctuations. 35 
The change-in-age variable is positive and significant for three of the 
six cohorts. The coefficients are also quite large, larger than the treatment 
effect in two cases. This result may be due to the relatively young age of 
the cohorts. Given the lack of work experience for many clients, a large 
impact of change-in-age is not surprising. As expected, the quadratic age 
specification is negative and significant for four cohorts. But this variable 
is probably collinear with the referral period dummies in that, given a fixed 
point of closure, both variables are proxies for program duration. This 
makes the interpretation of change-in-age in a VR setting less clear than 
in a program of fixed duration. 
35 Recall that 1982 was the trough of the recession and it may have been 
that these 
8
persons coming to the program at this time were experiencing 
cyclic.:il unenployment. The program then served as a •lacement device for 
persons with relatively minor impairments, at least those which did not require 
a lengthy stay in the program as evidenced by the short interval from referral 
to closure. 
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The F-test for women with emotional disabi li ties indica te s an overall 
lack of ex p lanatory power of the model. However, th is reus l t is perhaps 
unsurprising g i ven t he natu re of the d i sab ili ty . Of the three impairment 
classifications, emotiona l conditions are most likely to deteriorate over 
time. If this i s occurring during tre atment , the impac t of VR services could 
be offset by a decline in functional capacity. If functioning tends to change 
significantly , it would be desirable to include a health variable as a control. 
Recall that in our present fixed effe cts specification, factors such as health 
are assumed to be invariant or chan ge very slowly with the passage of time. 
A second caveat to these findings stems from a lack of information 
abou t the client's earnings path before and after t he onset of disability. 
Withou t this informa ti on we cannot be certain we have identified the 
appropriate bas el ine earnings. The estimates reported above use earnings 
for the period two years prior to treatment. In doing so, we are attempting 
t o identify baseline earnings reflective of the client's earnings path prior 
to the onset of disability. This focus could be inappropriate. In the case 
of a traumatic accident, it i s conceivable t ha t, in the absence of treatment, 
the person' s post-disability earn i ngs potential may indeed be zero . If so, 
post-disability earnings are the relevant basel ine . For this reason, it i s 
rea sonab le t o think of the two year pre-program earnings path as rendering 
a lower bound estimate of treatment impacts. Re-estimation of the model 
using earni ngs at r eferral would yield an upper bound estimate. 
Despite these qua lificati ons, the magnit ud e of the treatment impacts we 
find f or VR are comparable to those of t he CETA program in 1977 . Several 
studies (WESTAT, 1982 ; Bassi, 1983) found the tr aining impacts for women 
were generally positive and significant dep ending on the type of program and 
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minority status. The earnings gains rar.ged from $550-1200 for on-job-training 
(OJT), $500-550 for classroom trair:ins, and $650-950 for public sector 
e.mployment. The treatment impacts for work experience, which is similar to 
VR' s work adjustment training provided to mentally retarded persons, were 
ins ignificanc. Classroom training and OJT are similar to the services provided 
to the pl:-,ysical ly disabled who, in addition, receive some restorative services. 
For men, the CETA program impacts are often found to be negative. This is 
explained by the loss of work experience while enrolled in the program. 
Thus the findings of positive and significant coefficients for the male physical 
disability group receiving VR services presents a marked contrast with the 
more recent manpower training programs serving the economically disadvantaged. 
V. Conclusions 
While the VR program consumes $1.5 billion annually, it represents only 
five percent of the public transfer payments going to persons with disabilities. 
This fact prompts some obvious questions. Is public policy giving appropriate 
emphasis to rehabilitation and training in the mix of programs assisting 
persons with work disabilities? Should VR be expanded, perhaps at the expense 
of income transfer or other direct services, or instead, does efficiency 
suggest the program be scaled down. The answers to these questions depend 
on researchers' abilities to measure the earnings impacts of VR. As one of 
the oldest federal remedial manpower training initiatives, VR has not been 
without numerous evaluations; but the reliability of the estimates is vastly 
diminished by the quality of both the data and methods employed. The most 
glaring shortcomings are the lack of a randomized control group and the shallow 
earnings profiles typically available through the state agencies. 
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With the acquisition of longitudinal earnings for clients of Virginia's 
VR program, we have used evaluative techniques which have not been applied 
to VR. Lacking a pure experiment:11 design, we addressed selection bias using 
a defensible, though still imperfect, internal comparison group. Using a 
fixed-effects framework, we found the treatment impacts of \lR to be significant 
for four of six cohorts. Significant earnings gains ranged from $727 to 
just under $1,600 for the period -- estimates which appear plausible compared 
to those reported for CETA. 
However, our confidence in these findings is compromised by two data 
issues unique to evaluating a program serving the disabled. First, our fixed 
effects specification should be expanded to include a variable to control 
for the possibility that the client's health status changes during treatment. 
If health changes significantly, this imposes bias since these treatment impacts 
are estimated under the core assumption that unobservables are fixed or change 
only slowly with time. Second, we need more precise information about the 
date of disability onset. This would provide a clearer basis for identifying 
a base earnings year reflective of the client's true earnings path. 
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